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CASE NOTES
Securities Regulation—Rule 10b-5—Insider's Duty to Disclose Material
Information—Liability for Misleading Press Release.—SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co.'—In November 1963, defendant mining company sank a
test drilling hole at a possible mining site near Timmins, Ontario. A visual
inspection of the extracted core indicated extensive concentrations of copper-
zinc ore through most of its length. Chemical tests, completed in mid-Decem-
ber, also revealed traces of silver ore. In order to prevent a rise in land costs,
the company took steps to maintain secrecy, 2 then bought up surrounding
properties, and, in March 1964, drilled a second core intersecting the first. A
visual inspection of the second extracted core on April 7 reinforced earlier
findings of heavy mineral concentration. On the same day, a third hole was
begun in a plane parallel to that of the first two. By 7:00 p.m. on April 9, a
third core had likewise indicated substantial mineral concentrates.
At various times after each of these drillings, the individual defendants,
including the president, vice-president, and several directors of the company,
as well as company lawyers, geologists, and an accountant, purchased Texas
Gulf Sulphur stock and calls on stock. In February 1964, some of the indi-
vidual defendants accepted stock options from a company committee that had
no knowledge of the drilling operations. 3
On April 12, 1964, amid growing rumors of a major copper strike, the
company issued a press release to the effect that the reports were exaggerated
and that the find was merely a "prospect." Four days later it issued another
press release announcing a major ore strike. Two company officials bought
stock only minutes after this news was released to the press.
The Securities and Exchange Commission alleged that from the time the
visual estimates of the first drilling were known, the individual defendants
possessed material information which, as long as it was not disclosed to the
public, prohibited these individuals from trading in the stock of their company.
The Commission further alleged that the press release issued by the company
on April 12, 1964, was false and misleading. On the strength of these allega-
tions, the Commission instituted action in the district court against the com-
pany and the individuals, seeking decrees: (1) that individual defendants be
restrained from trading in company stock on the basis of material inside
information; (2) that they be required to offer rescission to the sellers of the
shares; (3) that those defendants who had transmitted inside information to
"outsiders" be required to make restitution to the sellers; (4) that the stock
options be cancelled and any shares or profits from them be returned to the
company; and, (5) that the company be enjoined from issuing materially
false or misleading press releases in connection with the purchase or sale of
1 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
2 The company suspended further drilling on the electromagnetic substance that
promised to contain ore. Members of the exploration group were instructed to keep re-
sults secret. The drill rig was moved away from the hole. Cut saplings were inserted
in the ground, in the area of the hole, to conceal its location. A decoy hole was drilled
for the benefit of the curious.
3 Members of the committee were ignorant of the company's finds at Timmins be-
cause of a company policy of keeping information of prospective mineral finds secret
from nonmanagement directors.
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its securities. 4 These remedies were sought under Section I0(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 5 and rule 10b-5 of the Commission,° promul-
gated pursuant to section 10(b). The district court HELD • The test of mate-
riality under rule 10b-5 must be a conservative one, since company insiders
ought to be judged by what they knew at the time they traded, and not by
judicial hindsight. When a company is confronted with inaccurate press reports
that might inflate the price of its stock, it is not misleading for it to issue a
press release which, though "gloomy or incomplete," was drafted with good
business judgment for the purpose of countering the reports. In addition, the
court declared that it is a legislative or administrative function, not a judicial
function, to decide how soon after disclosure of material information insiders
are permitted to trade in their company's stock.
This case was widely discussed even before it came to trial and has
aroused serious concern in legal and financial circles.? There were fears that
if the Commission were supported in its claim regarding the April. 12 press
release, companies would thereafter hesitate to release information to the
public and "corporate information will dry up." 8 It was -anticipated that
companies would be subject to suit if they did not disclose information which
might later be adjudged material, or if they did release information which
might later be adjudged deceptive.°
The company contended that the April 12 press release did not fall
within rule lOb-5, because it was not issued "in connection with the purchase
4 Complaint, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., Civil No. 65-1182, S.DN.Y., April
19, 1965, pp. 33-35.
5 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1964). This section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-
. . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so regis-
tered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
6 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (rev. 1964). This rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person;
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
7 See, e.g., Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The
Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 Va. L. Rev. 1271 (1965); Sym-
posium, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. Law. 1009 (1966); Note, SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co.: The Inside and Outside of Rule 106-5, 46 B.U.L. Rev. 205 (1966); Wall
Street Journal, Aug 22, 1966, p. 4, col. 2.
8 Symposium, supra note 7, at 1012 (remarks of William L. Cary).
9 Id. at 1013.
354
CASE NOTES
or sale of any security." 10 This argument was rejected in the light of Freed v.
Szabo Food Serv., Inc.,11 which held that a communication does fall within
the rule if its purpose is to affect the market price of the stock to the ad-
vantage of the company's insiders. Although that case concerned prospectuses
mailed to individual customers, rather than press releases, the court suggested
that the principle of the rule should be applied identically in both situations.
The rule encompasses "any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce,
or of the mails," "any device," "any untrue statement," or "any act .. .
which operates or would operate as a fraud .. .." It would be incongruous to
allow a rule generally proscribing manipulative devices to apply to prospectuses
but not to press releases, which reach a much larger portion of the investing
public.
The SEC had argued that the April 12 press release was misleading in
that the core results of five holes were available to company officials when
they drafted it, and that these results established the existence of substantial
reserves of proven ore. 12 The court found, however, that the officials who
drafted the release used reasonable business judgment in order to counter
what they considered to be exaggerated and inaccurate rumors. The court's
decision seems to be based on this alone, and gives little consideration to the
more basic question of whether the release in fact tended to mislead the
trading public. It can concededly be argued, in support of the court's decision,
that no single sentence of the release is literally deceptive, and that the use
of the word "prospect" to describe the company's discovery is not clearly
inaccurate. In the common parlance by which press releases are interpreted,
evidence of a body of commercially mineable ore, as derived from a series of
test drillings, does not cease to be a "prospect."
It is submitted, however, that the whole thrust of the release was contrary
to the known facts. The press release stated that "recent drilling on one
property near Timmins has led to preliminary indications that more drilling
would be required for proper evaluation of this prospect."" This sentence is
not literally false, but it leads naturally to the inference that the company
knew nothing definite about its find, and that inference is incorrect. "The drill-
ing done to date has not been conclusive," the press release continued." These
words raise the false inference that no reliable information could yet be
drawn from the drilling. "[L]lle statements made by many outside quarters
are unreliable and include information and figures that are not available to
TGS."" This is literally true, but it falsely connotes that none of the printed
rumors had any basis in fact. By failing to acknowledge its anticipation, as
of the date of the release, that it had made a substantial discovery, the com-
pany probably implied to the average investor that it had made no significant
discovery at all. The creation of this impression was, under the circumstances,
10 258 F. Supp. at 293.
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. IT 91317 (N.D. III. Jan. 14, 1964).
12 Post-Trial Memorandum of the SEC, July 5, 1966, pp. 55-63.
13 258 F. Supp. at 293.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
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deceptive and misleading." The company argued that it had intended simply
to control the rumors, not to mislead investors. Intent, however, is not an
essential element of a 10b-5 action brought by the SEC, as this court
recognized." Lack of intent was held immaterial to the court's finding that
two defendants had violated the rule by their purchases of securities. 18 But
there is no reason to differentiate between a manipulative purchase of stock
and a deceptive press release in the trying of a 10b-5 action, because either
of these activities misleads traders. Both practices contravene "the end
sought by the Act, to-wit, the lessening of fraudulent and sharp practices on
the securities market."" Therefore, the company's good business judgment
in drafting the April 12 press release to counteract rumors should have been
deemed immaterial to the decision.
The court then concluded that the April 16 release was the first full
disclosure. Some individual defendants argued that the previous reports
and rumors satisfied the disclosure requirements, but the court pointed out
that the actions of the company officers manifested a belief that such reports
were not effective as a disclosure:
Had they thought that their effect was to make the material infor-
mation public there would have been little purpose in making the
arrangements for a press conference, and issuing a detailed announce-
ment on April 16. The material information did not become public
knowledge prior to TGS's official announcement. Therefore, insiders
who purchased stock prior to TGS's announcement may not assert
as a defense that the material information had already become a
matter of public knowledge.20
The conclusion of the court is probably based on the assumption that reported
rumors, not attributed officially to the company, do not materially affect
investor judgment. The decision that the April 16 release was the first full
disclosure seems to rely also on an estoppel argument. In other words, since
the company acted as if it were making its first full disclosure, it will be
held to the consequences of this position. It is submitted, however, that an
18 Under rule 10b-5, statements made by a company must be considered "in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made . . . ." 17 C.F.R. § 240.
10b-5 (rev. 1964).
17 258 F. Supp. at 277-78. Compare Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th
Cir. 1963).
18 258 F. Supp. at 286-87.
Is Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627, 631 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
20 258 F. Supp. at 286. The defendants were called "insiders" throughout the case,
although the word "insider" is not used in the section or the rule. As used in 10b-5
actions, an "insider" is anyone who possesses material information that is not available
to the public. He need not be associated with the company. He becomes an "insider,"
for the purpose of the rule, by "a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the
personal benefit of anyone," and by the "inherent unfairness" of his taking advantage
of such information, "knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing." In
the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). Although a 10b-5 action
could be maintained without reference to the concept of "insider," the term has, never-
theless, been associated with the act since its enactment.
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argument of estoppel is improper. The court's duty was to make a simple
factual finding of whether the information about the company's discovery
had actually been fully disclosed to the trading public. The company's public
attitude with respect to previous disclosures may be of assistance in making
this decision, but should not be, as it was here, conclusive.
The exoneration of all but two of the thirteen individual defendants was
considered to be a major defeat for the Commission.” The findings as to the
defendants who were acquitted were grounded on two basic conclusions of
law: (1) the test of materiality must necessarily be a conservative one; and,
(2) use by an insider of his special interpretive ability and "educated guesses"
is not to be considered violative of rule 10b-5.
The holding that the test of materiality must be conservative is new to
the case law of the field.22 Simply stated, the effect of this test is to allow
an insider to withhold more information as "not material." The institution
of a conservative guideline actually results in a presumption in favor of the
defendant, giving him an advantage he did not have under the common law.
At common law, "a fact is material if ... its existence or nonexistence is a
matter to which a reasonable man would attach importance in determining
his choice of action in the transaction in question ... . "23 This rule is plainly
neutral; no presumption in favor of the defendant can be inferred from it.
The common law occasionally, but not usually, required a person in
possession of secret material information to disclose it to persons with whom
he was trading, or to forego the transaction." It was sometimes held that a
fiduciary relationship between the company insider and the person with whom
he was trading imposed this duty. 25 In cases that used this rule, there was
no statement or implication that the test of materiality is to be applied
conservatively. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, however, was intended
to extend the concept of fiduciary relationships to more transactions than
had been covered under the common law. According to the report that began
House debate on the act:
Unless the constant extension of the legal conception of a fiduciary
relationship—a guarantee of straight shooting—supports the con-
stant extension of mutual confidence which is the foundation of a
maturing and complicated economic system, easy liquidity of the
resources in which wealth is invested is a danger rather than a prop
to the stability of that system."
The courts have concurred in interpreting the act to require the extension
21 Wall Street Journal, Aug. 22, 1966, p. 4, col. 2.
22 The court cited for this conclusion one law review article,
7. 258 F. Supp. at 280-81.
23 Restatement, Torts § 538(2)(a) (1938). Compare List v.
340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965).
24 59 Yale L.J. 1120, 1125, 1147 (1950). See Strong v. Rapide,
which, though based on the Civil Code of the Philippine Islands,
of the common law.
215 E.g., Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949)
26 78 Cong. Rec. 7703 (1934).
Fleischer, supra note
Fashion Park, Inc.,
213 U.S. 419 (1909),
is a valid statement
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of fiduciary concepts to the laws of securities transactions. 27 "[T]he use of
`fraud' in Rule [10b-5(c)] cannot be interpreted in its narrow common law
sense."28 Both the section and the rule were structured to make the require-
ments of the common law more demanding. "Surely we would suppose that
Rule 10b-5 is as stringent ... as the federal common law rule which preceded
it."2° Further, materiality in a 10b-5 action is not to be used as an "escape
hatch" for defendants, as was often the case at common law. 3° It is submitted,
however, that the test of materiality imposed by the court in the instant case
is less stringent than that of the common law. The results of applying such
a test are crucial. The Texas Gulf Sulphur case was decided largely on the
basis of a determination as to when the constantly growing body of inside
information became material. It is entirely possible, therefore, that a less
conservative test of materiality would have resulted in a finding that more
than two defendants had violated the act.
Materiality, of course, is predicated on facts, not on the ability of
company insiders to make deductions from facts. The court seems to be
correct in its ruling that facts, as known to the defendants at the time of
trading, rather than their "hopes, perhaps with some reason," 31 or "educated
guesses," 32 are the criteria by which materiality is determined. As the court
explained:
[M] ost insiders necessarily have educated guesses about the pros-
pects of particular company programs. If it is held that purchases
made on the basis of educated guesses are proscribed by Section
10 (b) and Rule 106-5, insiders who purchase stock in their company
will do so at their peril. If they announce their educated guesses be-
fore purchasing and their guesses turn out to be wrong, they would
be subject to suit; and if they purchase and keep their educated
guesses to themselves and they turn out to be right, they would again
be subject to suit. The creation of such a dilemma would result in
insiders not buying at all although insiders should be encouraged
to have a stake in the companies for which they work. 33
On this basis, the court held that insiders who knew of the results of the
first two drillings were not precluded from trading simply because, as insiders,
they had a keen ability to judge the significance of the ore discoveries.
It is arguable, however, that the court is inaccurate in its finding that
the body of corporate information did not become material after the
extraction of the second test bore. Witnesses on both sides of the controversy
testified that the second hole indicated that the first had not merely followed
27 See, e.g., James Blackstone Memorial Library Ass'n v. Gulf, M. & O. R.R., 264
F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1959); Fratt v. Robinson, supra note 19.
28 258 F. Supp. at 278.
28 List v. Fashion Park, Inc., supra note 23, at 461-62.
30 59 Yale L J., supra note 24, at 1145.
31 258 F. Supp. at 283, quoting James Blackstone Memorial Library Ass'n v. Gulf
M. & O. R.R., supra note 27, at 450.
32 Id. at 283-84.
33 Id. at 284.
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a narrow vein." The SEC estimated, on a hypothetical extension of the ore
body in a zone only one foot to each side of the plane drilled, that at that
time a field of copper-zinc ore worth about $750,000 was indicated." This
hypothetical extension was, of course, markedly conservative, as was the
estimate derived from it. It is submitted, therefore, that trading, after results
of this drilling were known, was based on undisclosed material information.
The SEC argued that the defendants themselves believed the results
of these drillings to be highly significant." The Commission was unsuccessful,
however, in arguing that the defendants' subjective estimate of the significance
of the discovery was sufficient to indicate objective materiality to a "reasonable
trader." This SEC argument, while persuasive, seems inconclusive. The court
felt that a company insider, trained in his work, will necessarily be able to
evaluate information more thoroughly than the hypothetical reasonable
trader. The fact that an insider can take a given body of information, and
through his superior analytical ability reach certain conclusions, does not
make that body of information material by objective standards.
On the issue which may represent the greatest shortcoming in the opinion,
it is submitted that the court should have decided that trading a short time
after disclosure, before the market has had a chance to absorb the information,
is a manipulative device and contrary to the rule." The court could have
made this decision without laying down an inflexible rule as to what this
"short time" must be, by recommending a flexible test to be applied with
discretion from case to case The court could have found precedent for such
a decision in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 38 construing the
purposes of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 39 which contains language
parallel to that of rule 1013-5. That case held that an investment adviser's
practice of purchasing securities for his own account shortly before recom-
mending that security for long-term investment, and then immediately selling
the shares at a profit after a rise in market price, constituted a "device,
scheme or artifice to defraud" a client or prospective client. Mr. Justice
Goldberg, construing the purpose of the securities acts of 1933 and 1934 and
the Investment Advisers Act, wrote that "a fundamental purpose, common
to these statutes, was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of business
ethics in the securities industry." 40
 It is submitted that buying stocks in
one's company, minutes after material inside information is released to the
34 Post-Trial Memorandum of the SEC, July 5, 1966, at 46 -47.
85 Id. at 48.
38 Id. at 13-17.
87 The company held a press conference beginning at 10:00 a.m. April 16, and last-
ing 10 or 15 minutes. Summaries of the announcement were carried over one brokerage
house's news wire at 10:29 a.m. and over the Dow Jones Broad Tape between 10:54
and 11:02 a.m. Two individual defendants telephoned orders for stock at about 10:20
a.m. and 10:40 a.m.
38 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
89 54 Stat. 847 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. II 80b-1 to -21 (1964).
40 375 U.S. at 186.
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press, falls below a high standard of business ethics and completely vitiates
the goals of the rule. 4 '
STEPHEN C. IJNSINO
Trade Regulation—Administrative Law—All Writs Act—Power of
Court of Appeals to Issue Preliminary Injunction upon Petition of
Federal Trade Commission.—FTC v. Dean Foods Co.'—The Federal
Trade Commission petitioned the Seventh Circuit to enjoin temporarily the
consummation of a merger between the respondents, Dean Foods Company
and Bowman Dairy Products. The Commission had issued a complaint
against the respondents under Section 7 of the Clayton Act 2 and Section 5
of the FTC Act, 2 but no hearing had been held on the complaint.* The
Commission applied for the preliminary injunction on the grounds that it
was "probable" that the proposed merger would be found illegal, and that
upon consummation of the merger, Bowman would lose its identity as a
separate enterprise and the two companies could not then be effectively
restored to their original status' The Seventh Circuit dismissed the petition
on the basis that the FTC had no authority to institute proceedings for
temporary relief in the court of appeals.° The Supreme Court granted
certiorari, and then, in a 5-4 decision, reversed and remanded.? HELD•
The court of appeals has the authority to grant a preliminary injunction
against the consummation of a merger that will probably be found illegal,
and the FTC has the authority to apply to the court of appeals for such
preliminary relief. The court of appeals derives its power to grant injunctive
relief from the All Writs Act.° The Commission has the "incidental power"
to petition the court of appeals for injunctive relief under the All Writs Act
41 The SEC has recently expressed great concern over the fact that, despite com-
pliance with strict disclosure standards, corporate insiders are able to trade on the basis
of material information well before it has had time to be adequately disseminated to
the public. This, it is felt, "raises serious questions of law and propriety." Wall Street
Journal, Nov. 17, 1966, p. 2, col. 2 (quoting SEC Chairman M. F. Cohen).
1 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
2 As amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
As amended, 52 Stat. 111 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
4 Normally, under the procedures of the FTC, a complaint is issued against parties
whose conduct is believed to be in violation of the Clayton Act, a hearing is held on
the complaint, and a "cease and desist" order is issued if a violation is found at the
hearing. See FTC Enforcement and Procedure, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. ¶ 9574 (1966). This
is the only way the FTC itself can prevent a merger.
5 Under the terms of the merger, Dean was to acquire all of Bowman's dairy opera-
tions, which Dean was to consolidate into its own. Bowman was to cease to be a dairy
business and was to take the form of an investment fund with the name "Bowfund Cor-
poration." The assets of the fund were to be the cash and securities excepted from the
sale of the assets to Dean. Brief for Petitioner, p. 8.
6 FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 356 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1966).
7 On remand the Seventh Circuit granted the injunction. No. 15493, 7th Cir., July
18, 1966. Subsequently, the FTC ruled that the merger was illegal. 3 Trade Reg. Rep.
¶ 17,765 (1966).
8 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1964).
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